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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
:
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
:

Case No. 20040595-CA

RICHARD KENNETH LAMBETH,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to a third degree felony,
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 and
disorderly conduct a class C misdemeanor. The Defendant pled guilty on May
17, 2004 and was sentenced to a term of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison on
June 21, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISORDERLY
CONDUCT, THUS GIVING THE OFFICERS PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ARREST AND SEARCH THE DEFENDANT?
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of fact and law. The trial
court's legal conclusions should be reviewed for correctness, according no

deference to the trial court's conclusion. The trial court's findings of fact should
be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. "[Q]uestions of law
are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed
only if clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). This
issue was preserved for appeal when the Defendant entered a conditional plea of
guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). (R.
070/2-4).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
United States Constitution
First Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Utah Constitution
Article 1 Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
2

Utah Code Annotated
§58-37-8- Utah controlled substances act
(1) Prohibited acts A ~ Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
§76-9-102 Disorderly conduct.
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from a
public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition,
by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior;
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place;
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in a
public place; or
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which
the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is not
limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals,
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after
a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction.
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002) - Court of Appeals jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over: (e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital
felony;
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with count 1, possession of a
controlled substance within a drug free zone, a second degree felony and count 2,
disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor. (R. 003-004). On December 29,
2003, the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing. (R. 017). His trial attorney
filed a motion to suppress the evidence. (021-030). The State objected to the
motion. (R. 0334-038). A hearing was held on February 24, 2004. The trial
judge denied the Defendant's motion to suppress. (R. 039-041). Written findings
of fact and conclusions were signed on March 2, 2004. (R. 042-044). On May
17, 2004 the Defendant entered a "Sery" plea to possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, and disorderly conduct a class C misdemeanor.
(R. 051-052).

The Defendant was sentenced on June 21, 2004 to an

indeterminate term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. A sentence,
judgment and commitment was signed on that same day. (R. 054-55).

The

Defendant filed a notice to appeal on July 15, 2004. (R. 058-059).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 18, 2003, at approximately 3:45 p.m., the Defendant was at a
7-11 in Ogden putting gas into his car. (R. 069/13, 18). Sergeant McAllister and
Detective Hanson were at the same 7-11. As they were walking in to the 7-11,
they heard someone yell "fucking pigs." (R. 069/6-7). The officers recognized

4

the Defendant as the person who yelled at them. They knew the Defendant from
prior dealings with him. (R. 069/6-7). The Defendant was near the gas pumps
putting gas in a car. (R. 069/13) There was a lady nearby who was putting gas in
a van. There were several children in the van. (R. 069/8).
Sergeant McAllister initially ignored the Defendant.

(R. 069/9).

The

Defendant then yelled in an "extremely loud" voice "suck my dick." (R. 069/9).
The woman who was at the gas pumps hurriedly got in her van and drove away.
(R. 069/9). Sergeant McAllister said, "Richard, you better stop." (R. 069/9).
The Defendant yelled "fuck." (R. 069/10-11). There were two ladies walking out
of the 7-11 when this occurred. (R. 069/10-11).
Sergeant McAllister began walking towards the Defendant. (R. 069/12).
He also radioed two officers who were nearby and asked them to come to the 711. (R. 069/12). When the officers arrived Sergeant McAllister told them to
place the Defendant under arrest. (R. 069/17). The Defendant was arrested for
disorderly conduct. During the subsequent search incident to arrest, two baggies
with methamphetamine residue were found on his person. (R. 070/4-5).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbids a state from
punishing the use of words or language that is not within "narrowly limited
classes of speech." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).

5

The Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct after he yelled at police
officers "fucking pigs," "suck my dick," and "fuck." After the Defendant was
placed under arrest he was searched.

Two baggies which contained

methamphetamine residue were found on his person.
The Defendant was arrested for using language that is constitutionally
protected. Since, the Defendant didn't commit an offense, the officers didn't
have probable cause to arrest him. Therefore, the officers had no justifiable basis
to search him. The contraband which was found on his person should have been
suppressed by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED DISORDERLY
CONDUCT, THUS GIVING THE OFFICERS PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ARREST AND SEARCH THE DEFENDANT.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as
Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant
part: 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." The
Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a seizure is
unreasonable.

6

In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the Utah Supreme Court
defined its long-standing position on permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen,
the Court defined these levels as follows:
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to noncoercive questioning by an officer. Since the encounter is
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a
Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not required. Rather,
when "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences . . . give
rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime,"
an officer may initiate an investigative detention without consent.
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that]
requires probable cause." A level three encounter is also a Fourth
Amendment seizure.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). There is no question that in the case at bar,
the encounter quickly escalated to a level three encounter once the officers
decided to arrest the Defendant. The search incident to arrest was a continuation
of that level three encounter. Under both federal and state constitutional law, the
police must have "probable cause" that an offense occurred. In the present case
there was no offense, and therefore no probable cause.
In making the determination that no offense occurred, this court should be
guided by its decision in Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App.
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1990).

In Huber, this Court overruled a conviction for disorderly conduct

because the Logan City disorderly conduct ordinance

infringed

upon

constitutionally protected speech. The relevant portion of that ordinance is as
follows:
Intending to cause public inconvenience, noise, or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof:
(D) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes obscene
gestures in a public place.
Id. at 1374. This Court reversed the defendant's conviction "because Logan City
ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) is susceptible of application to substantial amount of
speech which, though perhaps vulgar or insulting, are nonetheless protected, it is
constitutionally overbroad and facially invalid." Id. at 1377
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that the type of speech
for which the defendant was arrested for in this case is constitutionally protected.
In Cohen v. California, 403 US 151 (1971) the Supreme Court was presented
with a factual situation as follows:
On April 26, 1968, the defendant was observed in the Los Angeles
County Courthouse in the corridor outside of division on the of the
municipal court wearing the jacket bearing the words "fuck the
draft" which were plainly visible. There were women and children
present in the corridor. The defendant was arrested. The defendant
testified that he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the
jacket as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feeling
against the Vietnam War and the draft.

8

Id. at 16.

Based on these facts, the defendant was charged with a violation of

California Penal Code §415 which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturbing
the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct."
Id. at 15. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction on the grounds
that the statute under which he was convicted violated the defendant's
constitutional rights. The Court specifically addressed the use of the word "fuck"
which is arguably the most "offensive" of the terms used by the defendant in the
present case. Regarding the governments prospective prohibition of that term by
statute, the Court stated:
Against this perception of the constitutional policies involved, we
discern certain more particularized considerations that peculiarly call
for reversal of this conviction. First, the principle contended for by
the State seems inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this
from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to
cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable
to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable
general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to
affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-letter word
being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of
its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual... Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed,
governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular
words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular
views. We have been able, as noted above, to discern little social
benefit that might result from running the risk of opening the door to
such grave results.
9

Id. at 26-27.

In applying these cases to the case at bar, the result is obvious. The

words used in the present case are identical to those uttered or written in the
above-cited cases. The fact that women or children may have heard these
utterances was a fact that presented itself in the Cohen decision. The Supreme
Court stated that "the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers
does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving
offense." Id. at 21. The Supreme Court also stated that "we have at the same
time consistently stressed that 'we are often captives outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech.' The ability of government, . . . to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words,
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in
an essentially intolerable manner." Id.
In the case at bar, the trial judge found that the Defendant made three
statements. These statements were, (1) Fucking pigs; (2) Suck my dick; and (3)
Fuck. (R. 043-044)
The trial court found that two ladies walking out of the 7-11 "appeared to
be disturbed by the Defendant's conduct." (R. 043). Sergeant McAllister was the
only witness who testified at the suppression hearing. He testified that "their eyes
got kind of wide and they kind of were hesitant to come out because they were
like, you know, what's going on out here type thing." (R. 069/11).
10

!

children in the nearby

vicinity of the Defendant were justifiably alarmed by the Defendant's conduct."
(R. 043). This factual finding is clearly erroneous as there was no evidence
presented to support this. Again, Sergeant McAllister was the only witness who
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inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created a risk thereof (ii) made
unreasonable noises in a public place." (R. 044).
It is clear from this ruling, that the Defendant's conduct that violated the
statute was that he made "unreasonable noises in a public place." The Court
found that it wasn't the profanity, but the "manner and tone in which he said the
statements that triggered the statute." (R. 044).
Sergeant McAllister testified that Defendant made these statements in a
loud voice. (R. 069/8, 11). Sergeant McAllister acknowledged that Defendant
didn't have any weapons, he didn't approach the officers, and he didn't act
aggressively. (R. 069/16).
The Defendant was arrested for yelling obscenities at the police officers.
Under the trial court's ruling, yelling an obscenity is an "unreasonable noise."
Notwithstanding the trial court's findings, it is clear that he was arrested for what
he said. It's difficult to believe that the Defendant would have been arrested for
disorderly conduct had he been reciting the pledge of allegiance in a loud voice or
yelling "fuck Osama bin Laden". It was the content of the Defendant's speech
that caused the officers to place him under arrest.
The disorderly conduct statute found in U.C.A. §76-9-102(2003) is
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague both on its face and as it was applied to
the Defendant.

This statute is overbroad because it fails to define what an
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them so he was arrested. While the Defendant's words may have been annoying
and certainly lacked civility, he has a right to express his dislike of the police in a
vulgar and insulting tone. See, Logan City v. Huber 786 P.2d at 1377. Under
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right" would be subject to arrest and prosecution since the majority of the people
in that community find that speech to be objectionable.
This case is very similar to Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). In Huber, the defendant used the phrases, "Fuck you," 'This is
bullshit," and "You guys are harassing me, you piss me right off." Id. at 1373.
The Defendant made these statements in a loud voice. Id. He also said, "Get
your fuckin' light out of my car, goddamit. You guys piss me right off." Id. at
1374.
The defendant was eventually placed under arrest for disorderly conduct
under a Logan City ordinance that read a person was guilty of disorderly conduct
if, [i]ntending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof: . . . .
(D) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes obscene gestures
in a public place[.]
Id.

This Court stated that "[i]t is apparent that the challenged subsection of the

Logan City ordinance criminalizes speech, i.e., obscene or abusive language
spoken with the requisite intent." Id. This Court went on to state that "[t]he
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech do not permit the government to
punish the use of words or language outside of 'narrowly limited classes of
speech.'" Id. (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972)).
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punishes as disorderly conduct a significant amount of protected verbal
expression, including criticism and challenge, vulgarities and remonstrations,
whether it is directed at a police officer, an ordinary citizen, or one who is not
even present, \ v itl i : -\ it i egai d fc i its lil :: z Ill) ii :i if: >a : t • : i 1 at 13 a ::ti lal addressee ' ' " > / at
1 37- :>.

The Logan City ordinance was overbroad because it conferred "virtually
unrestrained power on police to arrest and charge persons with a violation
This type of expansive, content-based ordinance restricting speech 'tend> ^ be
invoked only where there .
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Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 130 (1974)).
The disorderly conduct statute found in !\C.A. § 76-9-102 is not narrowly
or carefully drawn. Furthermore, it infringes on protected speed

c disorderly
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alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof." The difference in the statutes was
that Logan's ordinance read "he engages in abusive or obscene language or
makes obscene gestures in a public place," while the state statute reads "makes
unreasonable noises in a pur... ,

..^J."
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The statute fails to define what an unreasonable noise is. What is clear,
however, is that it criminalizes speech. This broad provision "confers virtually
unrestrained power on police to arrest and charge persons with a violation."
Huber, at 1376. This type of statute restricting speech "tends to be invoked only
where there is no other valid basis for arresting an objectionable or suspicious
person. The opportunity for abuse . . . is self-evident." Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. at 136. In this case, the Defendant was someone the officers
recognized and knew by name. Sergeant McAllister had been involved in a
previous arrest of the Defendant. (R. 069/18).
In Huber, this Court held that "[b]ecause Logan City Ordinance 12-89(2)(D) is susceptible of application to substantial amounts of speech which,
though perhaps vulgar or insulting, are nonetheless protected, it is constitutionally
overbroad and facially invalid."
In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987), the Supreme Court
stated "the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and
challenge directed at police officers." In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949), the Supreme Court stated "[s]peech is often provocative and challenging .
. . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest."
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words, and certain language that incites." Huber, at 1375.

ilic Defendant's

statements do not fit into any of the above categories. Fighting words are words
that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate bread r
the peace.

utterance do not inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Furthermore, it i> expected that police officers are expected to "exercise a higher
degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond
belligerenti) -

.ignting w 01 ds.r" C it); \j 1 i < luston v J i it I , l 182 ! J.S. at 1 62
IVfn 11111111 111 si'd ai e 1 :i : t "*' Dbscene " Ii 1 C h • 1 v C 1 7/ fof ni - ",

the Supreme Court addressed the word "fuck." The Court stated "[t]his is not. . .
an obscenity case. Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to ;he States'
broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some
significant way, en

. .

.

_ ....;.».„ .<

anyone likely to be confronted \\ itli Cohen's crudely defaced jacket." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. at 20.
Since the Defendant's conduct was constitutionally protected, he did not
commit a criminal offense and 1110 officers c * , . >ave probable cause to at1est
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him.

Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally

impermissible seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this
constitutional violation affect the evidence that was found during the search
incident to arrest. In the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485
(1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "[t]he exclusionary rule has traditionally
barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct
result of an unlawful invasion."
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. In State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) this
Court held:
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to
exclude 'all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution.' Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691. There
is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon
traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there any dispute that,
absent the good faith exception, all evidence obtained subsequent to
defendant's stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct.
407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
If the Defendant didn't commit an offense, then the officers had no legal
basis to justify a warrantless search and the exclusionary rule would apply. In
State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185 (Utah C. App. 2004), this Court stated, '[a]s officer
must have probable cause . . . to believe that the suspect has committed or is
committing an offense." Id. at 188 (citations and quotations omitted). Since it is
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probable cause that the Defendant had committed disorderly conduct. Probable
cause determinations are reviewed under an "objective standard: whether from
the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly

; drawn

arrested." Id. at 189(alterations in original)(citations and quotations omitted).
Logan City v. Ruber

was decided by this Court in 1990

Court decided Cohen v. California

in }°n],

of 1 louston v I i1 'ill in: i 198 / C -^ ..:
tc)11 '^ ' ai :1s police officei s. , sti et :!: * ]-

The Supreme

Gooding v. Wilson in 1972, and City7

; .* .^ : s .ig s p e e d l, in I ::li I dii lg fc i ill. language
!

:s

" i easonabl) ob jecti ,j e

police officer should understand fundamental constitutional law and recognize
that the Defendant's speech is constitutionally protected.
Since the Defendant didn't violate the law, the r-ffir.—q die1 not have
probable cause to arrest ; .

ontrabai

..

court. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Freedom of speech is one of this country's most cherished principles. Both
the federal and Utah State appellate courts have repeatedly upheld a citizen's
right to express themselves, even when the expression is distasteful to large
segments of society. "The constitutional right of free expression is powerful
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours." Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971). Furthermore the First Amendment "protects a significant
amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers." Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. at 461. Even if the speech is challenging or offensive, it is
protected "against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. at 4.
While the Defendant's conduct may have been annoying and his words
could have been more artfully crafted, his right to express his displeasure towards
the police officers is protected by the First Amendment.
Sergeant McAllister acknowledged that the Defendant didn't have any
weapons, didn't act aggressively and didn't approach the officer.

There was

nothing in the Defendant's speech that produced " a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
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suppress should be reversed.
DATED this \V day of October, 2004.
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ADDENDUM A

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031906457 FS

RICHARD KENNETH LAMBETH,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ROGER S. DUTSON
June 21, 2 004

J^

*3
PRESENT
Clerk:
dianew
Prosecutor: L. DEAN SAUNDERS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEVE LAKER (PDA)
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 21, 1970
Video
Tape Number:
D062104
Tape Count: 310
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/17/2004 Guilty
2. DISORDERLY CONDUCT - Class C Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/17/2004 Guilty

3rd Degree

HEARING
This is before the Court for sentencing. Defendant
present in custody from the Weber County Jail.

Page 1

054

*Oo4

Case No: 031906457
Date:
Jun 21, 2004
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Defendant is granted credit for all time served.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISORDERLY CONDUCT a Class C
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 90 day(s)
Credit is granted for time served.
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Jail term may be served at the prison.
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Jail term imposed to run concurrently with prison term imposed.
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Case No: 031906457
Date:
Jun 21, 2004
Dated this jT^J

day of

ROGER S7 DUTSOtf"
District Court Judge

Page 3 (last)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE CLERK:

Kenneth Lambeth, case number 031906457.

Time set for suppression hearing.
MS. BEATON:

Your Honor, the State (unintelligible).

MR. BOUWHUIS:

All right.

(Mr. Lambeth enters the courtroom.)
CHRIS MCALLISTER,
being first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. BEATON:
Q.

Please state your name and occupation.

A.

Chris McAllister.

Q.

Sergeant

Ogden Police Department.

—

THE COURT:

Could I get you to lean up a little bit?

That doesn't pick up very well.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
Q.

(BY MS. BEATON)

Okay.
Thank you.
Sergeant McAllister, how long have you

worked for the Ogden City Police Department?
A.

Just over 18 years.

Q.

And what's your current assignment?

A.

I'm sergeant over the Ogden Weber Metro Gang Unit.

Q.

How long have you been a sergeant?

A.

Two years.

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055
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Q.

Okay.

A.

In the gang unit two years.

Q.

And as a sergeant, you've been a sergeant for two years?

A.

I've been a sergeant for five years.

Q.

Okay.

On December 18th of 2003, did you go to the 7-11

in Ogden City up on Monroe?
A.

I did.

Q.

Where is that 7-11 located?

A.

The address is 803 24th Street.

Q.

Okay.

A.

On the corner of 24th and Monroe.

Q.

Sergeant McAllister, will you diagram for us this area

that we're talking about?
A.

(Witness leaves stand to draw diagram.)

Q.

Okay.

(Unintelligible)

The 7-11 is on where, Monroe Boulevard and 24th

Street?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.

A.

That's the building itself.

Q.

Okay.

A.

That's where the gas pumps are located.

Q.

Okay.

And the box in the middle is the 7-11 then?

And what is the sort of rectangular item?

(Unintelligible)

And when you came to 7-11, where did you park?
A.

There's a guardrail that runs north and south on the east

side of the building.

And I parked in that general area.

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055
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Q.

Okay.

Were you with anybody at the time?

A.

I was meeting Detective Hanson there.

Q.

Okay.

And so was Detective Hanson driving with you or he

was in a separate car?
A.

No.

We were in separate cars.

Q.

Where did Detective Hanson park?

A.

Same place.

Q.

Okay.

And what did the two of you decide that you were

going to do?
A.

We were going to walk in the 7-11 and get a drink.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Maybe some donuts.

Q.

Okay.

Very official police business.

Did the two of you then get out of the car and go

into 7-11?
A.

We did.

He got out and I got out, and just as I was

stepping over this guard railing -- because itfs about two
feet high -- I was stepping over it and I heard something
from this area.
Q.

Okay.

And when you say something from this area, did you

hear a voice?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you recognize that voice?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

A.

He was standing in this general area.

Not at the time.
Where was the individual standing at?

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055

6

Q.

Okay.

Near the pumps.

A.

Right by -- by them, yeah.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Well, this is covered.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Right

On the north side of the pumps?

Okay.

An awning.

And he was just in the central part

And originally when you heard something, what did

you hear?
A.

I hea rd someone yell, fucking pigs.

Q.

Okay.

What's the distance between where -- well, let me

ask you, did
< you determine who it was that was yelling this
at you?
A.

Yeah.

I turned and looked and saw Richard Lambeth

looking at us.

Just yelled it.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I did.

Q.

How did you recognize him?

A.

Well, Detective Hanson said, that's Richard Lambeth,

So did you recognize Mr. Lambeth?

isn't it?
And I said, yeah, it is (unintelligible). I didn't
recognize -- I didn't realize it was Richard until he said,
that's Richard Lambeth.
And I said, yeah, (unintelligible).
Q.

Okay.

J

(Unintelligible) awning.

of the (unintelligible) area.
Q.

J

So the two of you recognize Richard Lambeth then,

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055
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the defendant in this case.

!

A.

That's correct.

Q.

How did you recognize the defendant?

A.

I've been in contact with Mr. Lambeth on several

different occasions.
THE DEFENDANT:
Q.

(BY MS. BEATON)

Harassing me.

Okay.

All right.

So while he's here

and you are here, what's the distance between the pumps
versus where you're at trying to step over the -- the cement
barrier?
A.

From there to there is probably 60, 70 feet.

Q.

Okay.

Give us an idea in terms of this courtroom.

How

far is it in this courtroom?
A.

Well, it would be from about here out the doors, over to

the center of that round circle.
Q.

Okay.

So from here to where the railing is, essentially,

out in the hallway?
A.

Approximately.

Q.

All right.

And so from that distance you could hear what

the defendant was saying?
A.

I could hear he was -- it was yelling.

It was extremely

loud.
Q.

Okay.

And what did he yell?

A.

He yelled, fucking pigs.

Q.

Okay.

And he yelled it from here to here and you were

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055
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able to hear him?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Did you have any difficulty in hearing what he was

I

saying?
A.

No.

Q.

I mean, obviously, you didn't have anything to measure

the —

the level of how loud it was.

A.

No.

Q.

But from where you were standing, if you're here and he's

over there by the railing, does it still sound like yelling
or does it just sound like talking like we're doing here
today?
A.

No.

It was yelling.

Q.

Okay.

And is that what caught your attention and why you

decided to even look over in the -A.

That's --

Q.

—

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay.

area of the pumps?

So after the defendant yells that comment to you,

what do you —
A.

what do you and Detective Hanson decide to do?

Well, I looked and there was a —

a lady here.

van and it was parked here facing east.
process of pumping gas.

And she was in the

And there were several children in

the vehicle.
Q.

She had a

How many children would you estimate?

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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A.

I think there was three, actually.

Q.

And how old were the children, approximately?

A.

Approximately ages ten to six.

Q.

Okay.

A.

(Unintelligible)

She —

I looked at —

when I looked

over I saw Richard and I saw her and she looked at him and
she was like —

you know, her eyes got big and she seemed to

hurry and finish pumping her gas.

So what I said to

Detective Hanson was, yeah, let's just ignore him.

And we

continued to walk directly west towards the front doors of
7-11.
Q.

And did the defendant continue?

A.

Yes.

The next thing I heard was extremely loud, even

louder than the first one, was -- I could say it.
Why don't you tell us what the defendant said.

Q.

Go aihead.

A.

It was about —

it was about thds loud.

It was, suck my

die k.
Q.

And, again, was that directed in the direction of you and

Detective Hanson 7
A.

It was, yes.

We stopped and looked, and I said to

Richard, I said, Richard, you bette>r stop.
Q.

And was the woman still at the pumps?

A.

She was, but then she —

when --- when he said that, she

hurried and got in and drove away.

I —

get herself and her kids away from him.

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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Q.

Did she have a reaction on her face when she heard the

defendant again scream?
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

Objection.

Relevance.

Well, if he saw a reaction I'll allow

him to describe it.
A.

After that one, I don't know.

I didn't —

like I said,

she was hurrying and getting in the car and driving away and
I was focusing on Mr. Lambeth.
Q.

(BY MS. BEATON)

Okay.

So when you are talking to the

defendant, is he still in this area of the pumps or does he
ever move?
A.

No, he's still there.

Q.

Okay.

While he's in this area and you say to him, you

need to stop what you're doing —
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

—

A.

He yells one more obscenity.

Q.

Okay.

how does the defendant respond to you?

As he's yelling that obscenity, are you continuing

to walk towards the entrance of the store?
A.

I was.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I got right here to the doors and several ladies were

walking out of 7-11, so the doors were open.
Q.

How many ladies would you estimate?

A.

There was two.

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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Q.

Okay.

A.

And they were walking out and we —

I was like holding

the door for them to walk out after I had told him, Richard,
you better stop.

And thatfs when he yelled one more time, he

yells, fuck.
Q.

Okay.

And did he yell —

did he yell the word "fuck" as

loud as he had yelled -A.

Yes.

Q.

-- suck my dick?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Did you notice any reaction on the women who were

coming out the door?
A.

Well, they were kind of like shocked like

(unintelligible)

—

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:
A.

Objection again.

Relevance.

You can describe what you observed.

They -- their eyes got kind of wide and they kind of were

hesitant to come out because they were like, you know, what's
going on out here type thing.
Q.

(BY MS. BEATON)

Was it apparent that you were a police

officer by what you were wearing at that time?
A.

Yeah.

I was just like this.

Q.

Okay.

So you had a gun on your side and you had a badge,

A.

I had even more.

Q.

Okay.

I had a radio and I had handcuffs.

And Detective Hanson, was he in any kind of

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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uniform?
A.

He was.

Q.

What was he wearing?

A.

Like -- like this, the gun and badge.

He may have had a

shirt on (unintelligible). I don't recall.
Q.

Okay.

But, essentially, plain clothes or with some kind

of shirt with an insignia, but not like the whole uniform.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay.

As a result of the defendant then again yelling

fuck right while you were in the doorway area, what did you
decide to do?
A.
him.

I decided to talk to Richard and started to walk towards
In the meanwhile, I was radioing some -- a couple of

other detectives that were just down the street.
to come and —

I told them on the radio that —

I told them

to come down

because I was in a situation (unintelligible). I says come
on down.

So they did.

And they were only like maybe 30

seconds out.
And I walked over to him and he was continuing — I
don't recall his exact words, but he was continuing.
Richard, you know, why are you doing this?
know we're cops.

I said,

You know, you

Why are -- why are you doing this?

And he said something, and about that time they pulled
up and I said, he's under arrest.
Q.

What did you place him under arrest for?

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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A.

For disorderly conduct.

Q.

Okay.

Go ahead and have a seat.

MS. BEATON:

I have no further questions at this

time.
THE COURT:

Cross?
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. BOUWHUIS:
Q.

Yeah.

When you first parked and got out of your

vehicles, did you notice what Richard was actually doing,
physically?
A.

I don't recall —

pumps.

I know he was in —

in that area of the

I believe what he was doing was waiting for this girl

to pull the car up so he could pump gas into it.
Q.

Okay.

So you could see he had a vehicle there with him?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And -- and from all appearances, his standing near a gas

pump and there was a vehicle there, it appeared to you, would
it not, that he was waiting to pump gas in his car?
A.

That's what I thought. Yes.
Okay.

Did you see anybody else in his immediate

vicinity?
A

Other than the lady pumping gas —

Q

Right.

A

—

Q

Okay.

and the children?

No.

So nobody -- nobody appeared to be with him.

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

And you were —

when you first heard him yelling,

it was clear to you he was directing his remarks toward you
and —
A.

I felt like he was since he was looking at me.

Q.

Okay.

And it!s your testimony that you have no

conversation with him at that time prior to his making
those —

those -- yelling those obscenities to you?

A.

None whatsoever.

Q.

Okay.

and —

I didn't even see him.

So he yells two words at you and then you —

you

Officer Hanson was with you at the time?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

You continue walking toward the front doors of 7-11?

A.

Yeah.

I tell Detective Hanson let's just ignore him, and

we continue walking.
Q.

Okay.

And then when you got to the door, he yelled

again?
A.

He yelled, suck my dick.

Q.

Okay.

And, again, you felt that those remarks were

directed toward you and Officer Hanson?
A.

I felt like they probably were.

Q.

Okay.

A.

As soon as he started yelling it again I turned and

Were you looking at him when he said that?

looked and saw him —
Q.

And he -- I'm sorry.

Laurie Shingle, RPR
(801) 395-1055

15

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And he was looking at you?

A.

He was.

Q.

Okay.

And then when you opened the door to the store to

go in, he —

he yelled again when the two ladies were walking

out?
A.

(Inaudible)

Q.

And, again, you feel like those remarks were directed

toward you; is that correct?
A.

I don't —

Q.

Okay.

I can only assume.

But certainly -- because you werenft looking at

him at that time.
A.

No.

I was holding the door for the ladies.

Q.

Okay.

A.

They were the ones facing him.

Q.

Did you have any conversations with any other persons at

that scene who reported that the defendant had been doing
1 anything prior to your arrival?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

You had no information whatsoever regarding his

presence there prior to your arrival.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Other than the fact that when you pulled up, he was

there.
A.

That's correct.

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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Q.

Okay.

And so nobody came up to you at any point during

processing his arrest and the investigation.

No one came to

you and said, by the way, we have other information about
what he was doing?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

So everything youfve told us here, that's --

that's all you observed him do.
A.

Up to the point where I --

Q.

Right.

A.

—

Q.

Okay.

Is that correct?

stopped, yeah.
Now, you didn't see him with any weapons during

this -- this -- what would you call it -- social intercourse?
A.

I wouldn't call it that.

Q.

Okay.

But you didn't see him with any weapons; is that

correct?
A.

No, I didn't see him with any weapons.

Q.

Okay.

And you didn't see him running toward you

aggressively or —
A.

No.

Q.

—

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

otherwise?

And you decide —

yet you decide to call for

backup?
A.

No, I didn't call for backup.

transport him, actually, because —

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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Q.

Okay.

A.

—

I arrested him, but I wanted someone else to transport

him.
Q.

Okay.

I must have misunderstood.

I thought you

testified that you called for backup and then approached the
defendant.
A.

Is that not the correct sequence?

Well, I don't believe I used the word backup.

What I

said was there were several other officers that I knew were
close by.
Q.

Right.

But Ifm talking -- I'm getting at the sequence.

When did you call for transportation of the defendant?
A.

Just like I said, after the third time and I said to

Detective Hanson, okay, that's enough.
walking towards him.

And we started

I got on the radio and said to the

other guys, come over here.

Richard Lambeth is here.

Q.

Okay.

And -- and your --

A.

I didn't explain the whole thing on the radio to them.

I

just said, come over here.
Q.

Right.

And your intention at that point was you were

going to arrest him for the obscenities he was using; is that
correct?
A.

For disorderly conduct.

Q.

Right.

Because of the obscenities he was using; is that

correct?
A.

Well, because of the yelling, the —

Laurie Shingle, RPR
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the public, the -- the way that it affected the citizens in
the area. Yes.
Q.

Okay.

What time of the day was this?

A.

3:45 p.m.

Q.

Okay.

And by this time you, obviously, recognized the

defendant —

or the —

the suspect or person as Richard

Lambeth; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And you indicated you had previous dealings with

him?
A.

Yes.

Q.

When you say previous —

previous dealings, had you

arrested him before?
A.

I don't believe that I personally have.

I think I've

been present when he was arrested.
Q.

Okay.

Was that for drug use?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
MS. BEATON:

although they don't —

Nothing further.
I've got a couple of other questions
aren't really rebuttal.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. BEATON:
Q.

Did you ever interview the defendant?

A.

Once he was handcuffed and placed in the car, he kept
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asking to talk to me.
Q.

Okay.

A.

And I did finally go talk to him.

Q.

Did you tell him that you did not want to talk to him?

A.

That's correct.

I told him several times I didn't want

to talk to him.
Q.

What did the defendant say, though, when you did go over

to the car and tell him you did not have any interest in
talking to him?
A.

He just told me over and over several times that he was

sorry for what he had done.

And I said, well, what did you

do?
And he said, I'm sorry for the yelling.
And I said, no, not —

not just the yelling.

What did

you do?
And he said, I'm sorry for calling you fucking pigs and
for yelling.
And I said, not just me.

Who did you affect?

And he said the people around.
MS. BEATON:

I have no further questions.

State rests.
THE COURT:

Further questions?

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BOUWHUIS:
Q.

You took it from that to mean that he recognized his
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language was offensive?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And you found it offensive as well.

A.

I did.

Q.

And you assumed that the people around —

speaking of the

lady and her two children and two ladies coming out of the
store —

you assumed from your observation of them that they

found his language offensive as well; is that correct?
A.

Based on their reaction, yes.

Q.

Okay.

Thank you.

MS. BEATON:

Maybe if I could just follow up.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. BEATON:
Q.

Sergeant McAllister, do you think it was the fact that he

was using swear words and that kind of thing or was it that
he was yelling?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Objection.

That calls for

speculation.
THE COURT:

Thatfs leading.

I'll sustain the

objection.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Nothing further.
All right.

You may step down.

State rests,
All right.

Defense wish to present any

evidence?
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MR. BOUWHUIS:

Just a moment, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I've advised the defendant of his right to
testify at this hearing.

Also advised him that I don't feel

it's in his best interest to do so.
testimony would be relevant.
testify.

I don't think his

And so he's not going to

We would not submit any evidence.
THE COURT:

Mr. Lambeth?

All right.

Is that correct,

You decided not to testify?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Argument?

State will reserve rebuttal.
All right.

MR. BOUWHUIS:

Your Honor, as I understand it, the

State's position is that the State would concede that the
language that was used by the defendant is constitutionally
protected and that the issue —

certainly Brenda will have a

chance to correct me if I'm wrong, and even if I'm not, I'm
sure she'll want to get up and say something.
But my understanding is that's their position is that
the language the defendant used was constitutionally
protected, but rather the violation of law came because of
his way in using it, that he was yelling and disturbing other
people in the area.
Our position, Your Honor —

and assuming, again, that

that's what the State's position is, if that's the case
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then —

then we donft really need to get into constitutional

arguments about what is constitutionally protected —

the

language -- and what isn't, but rather exactly what happened
in this case.
I would submit to the Court that based on common sense,
having heard the evidence and based on the evidence from
Detective McAllister, that the disturbance as it was observed
by the officer came from the content of the language that
Mr. Lambeth was using it rather than the fact that he was
yelling it.
I submit that if the defendant were standing out there
at the gas pump reciting the Pledge of Allegiance or singing
Mary Had a Little Lamb or whatever, that though people would
have certainly looked and there may have been some alarm, I
suspect half of them probably would have laughed at the
defendant and suspect that he was mentally ill.
But I think it is important to note, Your Honor, that
from all the evidence that we have, the defendant was not
engaging in this behavior prior to the officers1 appearance
on the scene.

He was not directing his remarks toward

anybody else.

This is not a situation where he was parked in

front of this store protesting the store for some reason and
causing a -- an elongated or prolonged disturbance here.
I think it is (unintelligible) to compare this situation
to the one that Salt Lake City's trying to deal with with the

I
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upcoming conference they've got next week.

I think

everybody's aware of the situation they've had with the
street preachers standing out in front of crowds and yelling
their —

whatever message it is that they're yelling and

they're trying to deal with that.
But —

but as you're aware, they haven't —

preachers weren't arrested.

those street

Yet they're down there actually

using language that would incite people to violence and, in
fact, did on two occasions incite violence.
We don't have a situation here that's -- that's
protracted like that.

He's obviously there at the gas

station to put gas in his car.
very long.

He's not going to be there

And, in fact, as the officer indicated, he told

his fellow officer, let's just ignore him.
And I submit that if they had, in fact, just gone in the
store and gotten his donuts and left that the defendant's
behavior would have ceased at that point.
But while the State will argue that it was the yelling
and not the content, I submit that in this case, you can't
really separate the two, that —

that if, in fact, you simply

change the content of what it was Mr. Lambeth was saying that
the reactions would have been very different from people.
I'm not saying that that's unreasonable, that that's
just human nature for people to react that way.

Certainly

the language that he used was not civil in any -- in any
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manner, it was not genteel, it was not appropriate.
and Ifm not defending that.

And

—

But the language that he used

was constitutionally protected.

And the fact is, I submit to

the Court, that there would not have been a confrontation
with the officers, there would not have been an arrest if, in
fact, Mr. Lambeth had been saying something else.
And —

and so I submit, Your Honor, that in fact the

defendant did not commit the offense of disorderly conduct;
and, therefore, the arrest was illegal.

And the subsequent

search of Mr. Lambeth's person and the seizure of controlled
substances was also illegal.

And, therefore, the evidence

should be suppressed.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MS. BEATON:

Your Honor, we're not here to litigate

whether or not people who are out in front of the LDS Temple
in Salt Lake, whether or not those sorts of people who are
protesting and that kind of thing and yelling all sorts of
things, whether they ought to be charged with disorderly
conduct.
What we're dealing with is a situation in the afternoon
of December 18th.

Two officers and some customers are trying

to just go about their business at 7-11, and instead they
have to contend with what the defendant is doing at 7-11.
This isn't about the fact that the defendant used swear
words.

The defendant used some words that weren't even

J
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classified as what would be swear words, but he certainly is
making insulting comments towards the officers and that's —
that, unfortunately, is what the defendant's going to have to
deal with.
But the real issue is —

in the disorderly conduct

provision is whether or not he's becoming disorderly because
he's creating annoyance or alarm.

He's annoying, obviously,

the police officers, but they're prepared to ignore it and
they're prepared to go on.
He's alarming citizens, though, because the officers are
actually seeing reactions, reactions from the woman who's
pumping gas who appears to have a reaction to what the
defendant's saying and so she's hurrying and trying to get
out of there as soon as possible.
He's alarming the —

the women who are coming outside

the store, and we're dealing with a public business who's
trying to conduct business on a regular basis without having
somebody out in their parking lot yelling and screaming like
this.
We're also dealing with the situation where the
defendant is yelling so loud that the defendant can be heard
from where the witness stand is all the way out to where the
railing is out in the middle of the entryway of this
courthouse.
the —

That's how loud this defendant is yelling.

And

the defendant continues the yelling even after he's
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warned, you need to stop, Mr. Lambeth.
He doesn't stop.
continues.

And instead he goes forward and he

The officers are trying to deal with this as

low-key as they possibly can, but the fact of the matter is
the defendant is violating that particular statute because
he's creating annoyance or alarm and he's creating un —
unreasonable noises in a public place or unreasonable noises
in a public -- private place that could be heard in public.
This is a public parking lot where he's creating these kind
of noises, and Sergeant McAllister was justified in placing
the defendant under arrest for that behavior.
This isn't a situation where he's being punished because
of the words that he tried to use, although the words were
offensive and they may have contributed to the alarm.

It's

the fact that the defendant is yelling these things over a
huge parking lot area that is creating the alarm and the
annoyance by both the officers and the citizens.
And we would ask that you determine that this arrest was
permissible; and, therefore, the search was permissible.
THE COURT:

Well, of course, the courts have been

very careful to protect speech and protect verbal expression.
And I agree that that should be done, otherwise, we become
too oppressive in people's —

restricting people's right to

express themselves.
I think the state statute, however, is crafted quite
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carefully as it relates to this wherein it uses the following
language.

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if

intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he makes unreasonable
noises in a public place.
That —
the statute.
and —

those are the relevant section —

provisions in

The question isn!t what was said, but the —

and the Court finds that under many circumstances

those words could certainly be used without being a violation
of law.
I think you have to look, however, at the people that
are impacted by that.

For the officers, I think this is

something they would have to expect and couldnft say, well,
it caused me alarm or annoyance to the degree that I was
justified in making an arrest as it relates to them
individually.
But the Court does find that there were other persons
impacted by this —

these —

this yelling.

And a lady right

in front of him was there when he started screaming out these
profanities or these -- this language —

however you want to

describe it -- and would, obviously, when looking at the
situation could see that —
yelling it in a —

anybody could see that he was

kind of a confrontational type of manner

towards the officers.
And she was, basically, in the middle of this.
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right by him.

And I think, clearly, she would have been

alarmed by this where -- and she had three children in her
car right —

smaller children in the car right next to where

this type of yelling and confrontational type language was
being used.
Then for the officer to tell him to knock it off or to
stop and to quit doing that, then he yells in a very loud
word one other obscenity when two women are just walking
through a door.

And I think they very well could have been

alarmed.
So I do find that the alarm -- I've often wondered
whether annoyance is enough when it comes to protected
speech, but alarm is.

I think that's where we get into the

problem in this case.

And I find that there is sufficient

alarm where a person could reasonably be alarmed by the
conduct that it —

the defendant engaged in.

So that the —

the offense was committed of —

least there's certainly reasonable cause —

or at

or probable cause

to believe an offense committed by the conduct and,
therefore, the -- the arrest was proper and subsequent search
then would have been proper -- search incident arrest.
(Off-the-record discussion)
THE COURT:

And so that is the ruling.

Ifm going to

deny the motion to suppress.
MR. BOUWHUIS:

We need to get a trial date, Your
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Honor.
THE COURT:
and —

She's calling a telephone conference

if you could wait for a few minutes, but we're
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

—

We can just set it with Diane.
Yeah.

I'll have Diane set it with each

of you.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Okay.
And is it a one-day trial then?

MS. BEATON:
a drug case.

It's probably two because it's actually

They found a bunch of drugs and stuff —

or not

a bunch, but they did find drugs.
THE COURT:

Two?

Two days?

THE CLERK:

So is one.

THE COURT:

So is one.

THE CLERK:

So I don't —

Boy, two days is hard

to find.

I think we're going to be

in the same boat.
THE COURT:

But are we starting the telephone

conference now?

half —

THE CLERK:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

Let's go ahead and get that —

we're a

(video goes off momentarily).

(Video begins) —
on it.

Do you want me to start it?

but I'm not going to give further O.R.

I try, but there was
THE DEFENDANT:

—

All right.
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(unintelligible).
THE COURT:

I think it was because of your record,

THE DEFENDANT:

All right.

(Proceedings conclude)
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